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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1
 Was the award of attorney's fees and costs to 
Defendant/Respondent William Turner proper under Section 78-27-
5 (• (-f ^ '' "J 
2o If so, is the amount of attorney's fees proper in that 
the award included Defendant/Respondent William Turner's fee for 
pursuing his Counter Claim? 
3• Did the trial court err in not awarding Plaintiff/ 
Appellant J. Rodney Dansie's attorney's fees under Section 78-27-
56, U.C.A.? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
This case is governed by Section 78-27-56, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended and by Rules 59 and 60, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff/Appellant filed suit against six (6) 
individual Defendants, including Defendant/Respondent William 
Turner, alleging that the Defendant's have battered, assaulted 
and intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon both of the 
Plaintiffs/Appellants. (R.2-6). In addition, the 
Plaintiffs/Appellants sought punitive damages against all 
Defendants. (R.6). The Defendants filed counterclaims for 
defamation of character, negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, intentional infliction of emotional harm, malicious 
abuse of process, and assault. (R.23-37). The majority of 
Defendants' counterclaims were dismissed upon Plaintiff's/ 
Appellant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment prior 
to trial. (R.274). The Defendant/Respondent William Turner, 
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maintained his counterclaim for assault through the conclusion of 
his testimony at trial. (T.R.12). In chambers and without a 
record, Defendant/Respondent William Turner's counterclaim was 
withdrawn. (This was never told to Plaintiff/Appellant). The 
Honorable Leonard H. Russon directed a verdict of no cause of 
action as to the Defendant/Respondent William Turner, (T.R.12) 
and the jury after a six day trial found no cause of action as to 
the other Defendants. (R.332-338). 
The Defendants made a motion for attorney's fees, pursuant 
to Section 78-27-56, U.C.A., seeking $24,576.30 for Defendant 
Kenneth Norton (George T. Naegle, Esq.) and $4,587.35 each for 
Defendants John Thomas, Joe Totorica, Respondent William Turner 
and Thomas B. Shirley for a total of $18,349.40 (as per affidavit 
of Larry R. Keller) for a grand total of $42,925.70. (R.452-461). 
The Plaintiffs made a similar motion under 78-27-56, U.C.A., 
seeking $30,170.75 against the Defendants. (R.484). Judge Russon 
granted the motion as to Defendant/Respondent William Turner 
only, and awarded judgment for $4,587.35 in legal fees and 
$421.37 in costs against Plaintiff/Appellant J. Rodney Dansie, 
based upon Section 78-27-56, U.C.A. (bad faith), and denied the 
other motions including Plaintiff/Appellant J. Rodney Dansie's 
motion. No findings of fact or conclusions of law were prepared. 
(R.510). 
3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
L On or about December 21, 1988, Rod Dansie and Tiffany 
Dansie filed a Complaint against the Defendants. The Complaint 
was prepared and filed by the law firm of McMurray, McMurray, 
Dale & Parkinson. (R.2-7). 
2. On or about January 20, 1989, the Defendants John C. 
Thomas, Joe Totorica, Elvira Totorica, Kenneth Norton, William 
Turner, and Thomas B. Shirley, filed a Counterclaim in the above-
entitled matter alleging that Plaintiff Rod Dansie assaulted 
them, was guilty of malicious abuse of process, had intentionally 
inflicted emotional distress upon them, had negligently inflicted 
emotional distress upon them, and was guilty of defamation of 
character by the filing of Plaintiff's lawsuit. (R.23-38). 
3. By letter dated March 1, 1989, Rod Dansie advised his 
homeowners insurance carrier, Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company, 
of the Counterclaim and requested coverage and defense of the 
Counterclaim. 
4. Because the Counterclaim included a claim for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, Utah Farm Bureau agreed to 
defend the Counterclaim pursuant to a "reservation of rights." 
5. By letter dated May 17, 1989, Utah Farm Bureau assigned 
the matter to its insurance defense counsel, Morgan & Hansen and 
retained Morgan & Hansen to defend the Counterclaim. Morgan & 
Hansen entered their appearance as co-counsel for Plaintiffs on 
June 7, 1989. (R.87). 
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6. As discovery progressed, it became apparent that it 
would be necessary to present Plaintiff's version of what 
actually happened in order to properly defend the Counterclaim. 
So as to avoid duplication of effort and with the consent of 
Plaintiff and his insurer, Utah Farm Bureau, it was agreed that 
Morgan & Hansen would be sole counsel for Plaintiff and present 
his case and version of what happened in connection with its 
defense efforts. 
7. On or about October 23, 1989, Defendants Joe Totorica, 
Elvira Totorica, and John C. Thomas made a Motion for Leave to 
Amend their Counterclaim to include a Sixth Cause of Action for 
Malicious Prosecution. (R.117-120). 
8. On or about October 27, 1989, Defendant Kenneth Norton 
joined in that Motion for Leave to Amend Counterclaim to include 
a Sixth Cause of Action for malicious prosecution. (R.142,143). 
9. On or about November 15, 1989, by Minute Entry, the 
Court ruled that Defendants' Motion to Amend their Counterclaim 
to allege a cause of action of malicious prosecution be denied 
for the reasons set forth in Plaintiff/Appellant's Response 
Memorandum. (R.146). 
10. On or about January 2, 1990, Plaintiff/Appellant 
submitted a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment asking that the 
Counterclaim of the Defendants/Respondents be dismissed. (R.214-
229) . 
11. On January 22, 1990, the Court, in response to said 
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Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, dismissed Defendant/ 
Respondent's counts for malicious abuse of process, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of 
emotional distress and defamation of character. The Court 
allowed the assault cause of action to go forward to trial. 
(R.271-275). 
12. The Defendant Kenneth Norton withdrew his counterclaim 
for assault the day that trial began. 
13. The Defendant William Turner withdrew his counterclaim 
for assault following his direct examination and the majority of 
Plaintiff's cross-examination of him. 
14. Following a six-day trial, the jury returned a no 
cause-of-action verdict with respect to the counterclaim for 
assault of the Defendants Joe Totorica, Elvira Totorica, John 
Thomas, and Thomas B. Shirley. (R.395-405). 
15. Plaintiff had an open offer to Defendants from the 
conclusion of the trial to not pursue costs or attorney's fees if 
the Defendants would not pursue costs or attorney's fees. The 
Court said it to be in the best interests of all parties 
concerned that this matter be brought to a conclusion without 
further action tending to aggravate the open wounds between the 
parties. Defendants rejected Plaintiff's offer, insisting that 
Plaintiff also must agree to stay out of the High Country Estates 
subdivision and to contract out all work of operation of the 
Foothills Water Company which necessitates Mr. Dansie entering 
the subdivision. 
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16. In spite of this Court's counsel and advice to "bury 
the hatchet," counsel for Defendants are insistent on pursuing an 
award of attorney's fees in this matter. (T.R.17-19). 
17. All parties, including the Defendants, were represented 
by lawyers retained by insurance companies, by reason of their 
homeowners policies of insurance. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The emmense weight of evidence, as set forth in this brief, 
establishes that Respondent's counterclaims against Mr. Dansie 
were brought in bad faith and were without merit, therefore, the 
appellant should be awarded attorney's fees. (Sec. 78-27-56, 
U.C.A.). 
The trial court abused it's descretion when it awarded 
attorney's fees to Respondent William Turner, since there was not 
sufficient factual evidence on the record to justify and meet the 
required elements set out by the Supreme Court of Utah in Cady 
v. Johnson, (671, p.2d 149, Utah 1983) to allow the trial court 
to award attorney's fees. (Sec. 78-27-56, U.C.A.). 
The facts in the record simply do not support the elements 
necessary to find that the Appellant's claims against Defendant 
William Turner, were meritless and were brought in bad faith. 
Appellant's conduct did not rise to a level of lack of good 
faith. There was no evidence that Appellants lacked an honest 
belief in their claims, that they had an intent to take an 
unconsionable advantage of Defendants, nor that they had intent 
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to or knowledge that their suit would hinder, delay or defraud 
Defendants. 
At the very least, in light of the fact that the jury called 
the case a "draw" and no one won and in light of the fact all 
parties had insurance representation, and Plaintiff's claim and 
Defendants' counter claim resulted in no course of action, each 
party should be required to bear his or her own fees and costs. 
This is what the trial court counseled at the conclussion of the 
trial. (Ct. p.16-19). The Court awarded attorneys fees to 
Defendant/Respondent Turner and the Court should also award 
attorneys fees to Appellant, since Mr. Turner's counter claims 
were dismissed and Defendant's award of fees included attorney's 
fees to pursue those counter claims. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES 
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 78-27-56 
As adequately set forth in Defendant Kenneth Norton's 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of his Motion for 
Attorney's Fees, (R.444-448), in order to recover for a bad faith 
filing under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-56, as interpreted 
by case law, the moving party must establish (1) that the action 
was without merit; and (2) that the action was brought in bad 
faith. Cady v. Johnson, 671 p.2d 149 (Utah 1983). The Court 
in Cady v. Johnson, (supra), made it very clear that just 
because a party prevails in a lawsuit does not mean that that 
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party is entitled to attorney's fees under UCA Section 78-27-56. 
(R.444-448). The Court stated as follows: 
"The statute is narrowly drawn. It was not meant 
to be applied to all prevailing parties in all 
civil suits." 
Id. at 151. 
With respect to the first standard, that the action be 
"without merit," the Court stated in Cady v. Johnson, (supra), 
that "the term implies bordering on frivolity." The dictionary 
definition of "frivolous" is "of little weight or importance, 
having no basis in law or fact." Id. and Add. #A p.593. 
Following the presentation of Plaintiff's/Appellant's case 
at trial, Defendants/Respondents made a Motion for a Directed 
Verdict on all counts. (T.R.10). The Court granted 
Defendants/Respondents' Motion for a Directed Verdict with 
respect to William Turner and with respect to the claim of 
assault on behalf of Tiffany Dansie against the 
Defendants/Respondents Joe Totorica, Elvira Totorica, Thomas B. 
Shirley, and Kenneth Norton. Otherwise, the Motion for directed 
verdict was denied. (T.R.10). 
A directed verdict is only appropriate when the Court is 
able to conclude, as a matter of law, that reasonable minds would 
not differ on the facts to be determined from the evidence 
presented. Management Comm. v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 p.2d 
896 (Utah 1982). The Court determined that sufficient evidence 
was presented, except in those areas mentioned above, for 
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Plaintiff's/Appellant's case to go to the jury. Defendants/ 
Respondents have offered no case law to support their position 
that in spite of the fact that their Motion for Directed Verdict 
was denied, attorney's fees should be awarded under UCA, Section 
78-27-56. Such a position is contradictory on its face. How 
could a claim be "without merit" when sufficient evidence was 
presented to send the claim to the jury? Certainly, with respect 
to those claims that survived Defendants'/Respondents' Motion for 
Directed Verdict, Defendants'/Respondents' Motion for attorney's 
fees should be denied, it being impossible for the Defendants/ 
Respondents to meet the first requirement of such a statutory 
award. (Add. #A, p. 593-609, Attorney's Fees in Bad Faith, 
Meritless Actions). 
Even in the event of the granting of a directed verdict, the 
conclusion does not necessarily follow that the claim was without 
merit. Plaintiff/Appellant was proceeding on the theory that the 
group of Defendants/Respondents committed an assault on him and 
his daughter, and thereby also intentionally caused emotional 
distress. Assault is committed by a person acting with the 
intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact with another 
person or to create an imminent apprehension of such a contact 
and the other person is thereby put in such imminent 
apprehension. A person commits the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress or where any reasonable person 
would have known that such would result and his or her actions 
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are of such a nature as to be considered outrageous or 
intolerable in that they offend against the generally accepted 
standards of decency and morality. It stands to reason that if 
you join together with a group of people in a mob action and 
march down toward the victims in an angry manner, screaming and 
yelling and making threats, you are more likely, as a group, to 
cause immediate apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact 
and emotional distress than if you acted alone. Being involved 
in such a mob action certainly makes the acts more outrageous an 
intolerable. (Add. #A, p.598-599). 
Pursuing such a legal theory which would amount to a logical 
extension of the case law in the State of Utah should not be 
punished by an award of attorney's fees. The theory was 
warranted by existing law or constituted a good faith argument 
for the extension of existing law (see Rule 11, URCP). To punish 
a plaintiff for attempting to pursue a good faith argument for 
extension of the existing law would run counter to the American 
legal system which is built upon the careful development of the 
law through the case law approach. It would be the "death knellSf 
to our present legal system if every plaintiff who tried to 
pursue the broadening of legal theory was punished under a bad 
faith statute. (Add. #A, pp. 599-602) «, 
Even with respect to the Defendant/Respondent William 
Turner, Plaintiff's/Appellant's testimony brought him within that 
group of individuals Plaintiff recognized as having surrounded 
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him in front of his truck. Even though Mr. Turner did not stand 
face to face with Mr. Dansie, he chose to join the group, adding 
to the aura of fear. He stated to Mr. Dansie, according to Mr. 
Dansie's testimony, "We've got you now, Rod." Clearly, Mr. 
Turner was an active participant in the group assault. 
(T.R.3,4). 
Even if the Court determines that the claims that were 
dismissed upon Defendants '/ResPondents' Motion for a Directed 
Verdict were without merit, the requirements of UCA, Section 78-
27-56 have still not been met. (Add #A, p.601,602). In Cady v. 
Johnson, the Court determined that the plaintiffs there had no 
legal basis for recovery but went on to state that even if the 
claim was without merit, the trial court must also find that 
plaintiff's conduct in bringing his suit was lacking in good 
faith. Cady v. Johnson, 671 p.2d 149, 151. The Court in Cady 
v. Johnson, adopted the Washington Supreme Court's definition of 
"good faith" as follows: 
(1) An honest belief in the propriety of the 
activities in question; (2) No intent to take 
unconscionable advantage of others; and (3) No 
intent to, or knowledge of the fact that the 
activities in question will hinder, delay or 
defraud others. 
The Court went on to state that to establish lack of good faith, 
one must prove that one or more of these factors is lacking. Id. 
(Add. #A, p.599-603). 
There was no evidence at trial that Mr. Dansie did not have 
an honest belief that William Turner assaulted him and 
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intentionally caused him emotional distress. Mr. Dansie 
testified that Mr. Turner was within close proximity to him and 
made the comment, "We've got you now, Rod." (T.R. p.4). There 
was no evidence to indicate that Mr. Dansie named Mr. Turner with 
the intent to take unconscionable advantage of him* Such would 
certainly be the case had Mr. Turner not joined with the group in 
coming down to participate in the "group assault." (T.R. p.3). 
Mr. Turner's decision to come down and be part of the fray in 
spite of the fact that, according to his affidavit testimony, he 
knew of Rod Dansie's "background and penchant for violence on 
occasion" (C.R.264), should bar his claim for fees. (Add. #A, 
p.593-610). 
William Turner hardly comes to this Court asking for fees 
with clean hands. On the one hand, he testified that he was 
never closer than thirty feet from the Plaintiff, but on the 
other hand, in order to promote his Counterclaim, he testified in 
his Affidavit that "J. Rodney Dansie's outrageous and 
uncontrolled actions, including the waving in a threatening 
manner of a pan, placed myself and others in immediate 
apprehension that an assault would take place." (Affidavit of 
William Turner, paragraph 2, emphasis added). (R.264). In 
William Turner, we have an individual who was willing to pursue 
an obviously frivolous counterclaim for assault, until on direct 
examination he discovered the difficulty of maintaining the 
position that he had been personally assaulted and yet was never 
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close enough to Mr. Dansie to assault him. At that point, upon 
questioning by Mr. Keller as to why he had brought his 
counterclaim, Mr. Turner's answer brought to a head this 
contradictory and dishonest position as he responded that he did 
not know why he had brought the counterclaim for assault. 
(T.R.10). In light of such testimony, it is the Plaintiff who 
should be allowed to recover attorney's fees against Mr. Turner, 
who according to his own testimony brought a claim for assault 
which was without merit and in bad faith. (Add. #A, p.593-610). 
The additional count that was dismissed upon directed 
verdict was the claim of Tiffany Dansie that she had been 
assaulted by the Defendants Joe Totorica, Elvira Totorica, 
Kenneth Norton, William Turner and Thomas B. Shirley. Again, 
Plaintiff/Appellant was requesting an extension of existing law 
in seeking recovery under a group assault theory. Although 
Tiffany Dansie was in her father's truck, who testified that the 
group of people surrounding her father screaming and yelling at 
him in an uncontrolled manner, which she had not previously 
witnessed, placed her not only in fear for her father's safety 
but for her own safety as well. This mob action was a thin line 
away from the breaking point in which serious physical injury 
would have been inevitable. Tiffany Dansie was, by the actions 
of the Defendants/Respondents, placed in imminent apprehension of 
a harmful or offensive contact and suffered emotional distress by 
actions of the Defendants/Respondents which any reasonable person 
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would have known would have resulted in such emotional distress 
in a thirteen-year-old girl. Defendants'/Respondents' actions 
were outrageous and intolerable in light of the presence of this 
young girl. Defendants/Respondents should have been held 
accountable, knowing full well the aura of fear that would be 
created by their group action and by the natural sensitivities of 
a thirteen-year-old girl. The group assault theory that Tiffany 
Dansie was pursuing was warranted by existing law or constituted 
a good faith argument for the extension of existing law and was 
not brought "without merit." Even if the Court deems such a 
claim to be without merit, it was not pursued in bad faith and 
did not result in any increased cost to the Defendants/ 
Respondents in defending against those claims that were not 
dismissed upon directed verdict. (Add. #A, p.599-601). 
POINT II 
THE COUNTERCLAIM OF DEFENDANTS WAS WITHOUT MERIT AND WAS 
PURSUED IN BAD FAITH, WARRANTING AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES TO PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT. 
Plaintiff's/Appellant's initial Complaint was prepared and 
filed on or about December 21, 1988, by the firm of McMurray, 
McMurray, Dale & Parkinson. An Answer and Counterclaim was filed 
on January 20, 1989c Thereafter, by letter dated March 1, 1989, 
Plaintiff requested that his homeowner's insurance carrier, Utah 
Farm Bureau, cover and defend the Counterclaim. Utah Farm Bureau 
agreed to defend the Counterclaim pursuant to a "reservation of 
rights" and by letter dated May 17, 1989, retained its insurance 
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defense firm, Morgan & Hansen, to defend the Counterclaim, 
Pursuant thereto, Morgan & Hansen entered its appearance as co-
counsel for Plaintiff on June 7, 1989. As discovery progressed, 
it became apparent that it was largely a duplicative effort to 
have separate counsel with respect to Plaintiff's claims and with 
respect to Plaintiffs/Appellant's defense against 
Defendants'/Respondents' counterclaims. Therefore, after 
a discussion between Plaintiff/Appellant and their insurer, it 
was agreed that since it would be necessary to present 
Plaintiff's/Appellant's version of what actually happened in 
order to properly defend the Counterclaim, that the law firm of 
Morgan & Hansen would be sole counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant and 
present his case and version of what happened. The 
Plaintiff/Appellant version of what happened, if believed, would 
impeach the Defendants'/Respondents7 credibility as to their 
version of what happened as set forth in their Counterclaim and 
hopefully result in a no cause of action with respect to their 
Counterclaim, which is what the jury so determined. Thus, Morgan 
& Hansen set upon a course of action to defeat 
Defendants'/Respondents' Counterclaim. Depositions of each of 
the Defendants/Respondents were taken and a Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment was prepared and filed, as a result of which all 
claims of Defendants/Respondents, except for their cause of 
action for assault, were dismissed. (R.271). 
Plaintiff/Appellant incorporates his Memorandum in Support 
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of his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment herein for the 
argument that Defendants'/Respondents7 Counterclaim was without 
merit and pursued in bad faith. Defendants'/ResPondents' 
Counterclaim for malicious abuse of process, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of 
emotional distress and defamation of character were all 
dismissedc (R.271). Defendant's/Respondent's attempt to amend 
their Counterclaim for an additional cause of action for 
malicious prosecution was also denied by the Court. (R.271). 
Defendant's/Respondent's bad faith in bringing such claims 
was brought out by Mr. Keller in direct examination as each 
Defendant testified that he or she only brought their 
Counterclaim because of the suit brought by Mr. Dansie. (T.R.10). 
In other words, they were motivated by revenge rather than by the 
good faith pursuit of claims. (Add. #A, p.597). 
The counts in Defendant's/Respondent's Counterclaim that 
were dismissed were largely based upon the false allegation that 
Mr. Dansie regularly filed lawsuits similar to the one in the 
instant case in an effort to harass and intimidate persons who 
had challenged his alleged ownership of the water rights and 
water delivery system for Hi-Country Estates under circumstances 
where such lawsuits had been dismissed as being totally without 
merit. (Defendants//ResPondents/ Counterclaim, paragraph 26). 
(R.31). Upon questioning of each of the Defendants/Respondents 
in their depositions, none were able to supply any factual basis 
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for this allegation in that the only suits Mr. Dansie had 
previously brought were for collection of unpaid standby fees of 
lot owners in the Hi-Country Estates. This blatantly false theme 
was pursued by Defendant's/Respondent's counsel throughout the 
trial. (Add. #B, p.1-9). 
Even Defendant's/Respondent's claim for assault was exposed 
as having been brought in bad faith by testimony at trial. 
Sharon Shirley, the wife of Defendant Thomas B. Shirley, who by 
all testimony was the individual that Rod Dansie came the closest 
to during the pan-waving incident, testified that the whole 
incident was a laughing matter which no one took seriously and 
that she was never placed in fear for her personal safety as a 
result of the incident. James Schoudel, one of Defendants' key 
witnesses, also testified that people were laughing at Mr. Dansie 
as he was waving the pan. And yet, because the Defendants/ 
Respondents were angry that Mr. Dansie was pursuing his claims in 
this matter, they elected to intentionally lie about their own 
personal fear of being hit by the pan. Even though Mr. Thomas, 
Mr. Norton, and Mr. Turner, by their own testimony, were never 
close enough to have any kind of fear about the pan incident, 
they elected to pursue such a frivolous and bad faith claim. See 
the depositions, (R.264), and affidavits of these Defendants. 
(T.R.10). If anyone should be awarded attorney's fees in this 
matter, it should be the Plaintiff/Appellant for having to defend 
against counterclaims built upon intentional lies propounded 
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because the Defendants/Respondents were angry at being involved 
in this litigation. (Add. #A, p.602). 
Because of the obvious weakness of their position with 
respect to a claim for assault by the pan incident, the 
Defendants elected to pursue a theory that they had been 
assaulted by the vehicle of Mr. Dansie as he pulled away from the 
incident. (R.8). Such a theory was pursued in spite of testimony 
that placed all of the Defendants/Respondents, except for Kenneth 
Norton, to either side of the truck as it pulled away. Mr. 
Norton, in order to support Mr. Thomas in his claim that he was 
simply trying to close the door to keep Tiffany Dansie from 
falling out as Rod Dansie pulled away, was compelled to testify 
that he stood and watched the entire incident as the truck pulled 
away. He testified that he was not afraid of being run over and 
he did not step out of the way even though he was the one 
Defendant/Respondent in front of the truck as it pulled away. 
In spite of all of the efforts of Defendant's/Respondent's 
counsel to attempt to paint the picture that their clients were 
innocent victims of Mr. Dansie's "scheme" to set up the incident 
in order to pursue his litigation in this matter, the real 
evidence clearly shows six Defendants/Respondents willing to lie 
based on a belief that their lies were justified because of the 
actions and representations of Mr. Dansie. It was apparent from 
the trial that Mr. Dansie was at least sincere in his beliefs and 
pursuit of his claims and it was equally obvious that the 
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Defendants//ResPondents/ claims were based solely on revenge 
factors rather than based upon truthful pursuit of legitimate 
claims, (Add. #A, p.599-602), (Add. #B, p.1-9). 
CONCLUSION 
In order to recover for a Bad Faith filing under U.C.A. 
Section 78-27-56, as interpreted by case law, the moving party 
must establishi (1) that the action was without merit and 
(2) that the action was brought in bad faith. Just because a 
party prevails in a lawsuit, does not mean that that party is 
entitled to an award of attorney's fees. The claim was not 
"without merit", since it was submitted to the Jury for the group 
of Defendants. 
The case law is that to establish lack of good faith, one 
must prove that one of the three factors discussed in Cady v. 
Johnson, (supra),is lacking. The evidence at the trial indicated 
that Mr. Dansie had: (1) an honest belief that Mr. Turner 
assaulted him and his daughter and intentionally caused emotional 
distress, if not alone as part of the mob group. There was (2) 
no intent by Mr. Dansie to take unconscionable advantage of 
others and there was (3) no intent or knowledge of the fact that 
the activities in question would hinder, delay, or defraud 
others. Even if the Court deems such a claim to be without 
merit; the claims were not pursued in bad faith and did not 
result in any increase of cost to the Defendants/Respondents in 
defending against those claims that were not dismissed upon 
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directed verdict. Failure to prevail in the case doesn't 
establish bad faith. The trial court exceeded it's authority in 
awarding fees to the plaintiff, William Turner, and not awarding 
fees to Mr. Dansie for Turner's frivilous counter claims. If 
anyone should be awarded fees in this matter, it should be the 
Appellant for having to defend against counter claims built upon 
intentional lies propounded because the Respondants were angry at 
being involved in this litigation. 
It is respectfully submitted that the great weight of 
evidence, as set forth above, affirmatively establishes that the 
Defendant/Respondent Counterclaims against the 
Plaintiff/Appellant were brought in bad faith and were without 
merit, and that therefore the Plaintiff/Appellant should be 
awarded his attorney's fees pursuant to UCA, Section 78-27-56. 
At the very least, in light of the fact that all parties had 
insurance representation, and Plaintiff/Appellant claims and 
Defendant/Respondent counterclaims resulted in a no cause of 
action, each party should be required to bear his or her own fees 
and costs. (Add. #B, p.1-9). 
The Appellant did not appeal the special jury verdict due to 
the cost of another full-blown trial. The fact that Appellant 
failed to meet his burden of proof does not mean the assault did 
not happen, it only means that when the stories were retold, the 
jury was not convinced based on the evidence presented. 
It certainly does not mean that the assault did not happen 
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and that Plaintiff's/Appellant's claims did not have merit 
partially in light of the fact in this case where all of the 
Defendants and most of the witnesses were people whom the 
Plaintiff/Appellant had participated with through a corporation. 
This corporation, owned by Appellant, was in collection of legal 
debts owed to the small water company with fifty-three (53) 
customers. The water company would be out of business if the 
debts were not collected. 
The Judge directed a verdict as to Turner, but the jury 
decided the case with regards to the other Defendants. If the 
lawsuit against a group of Defendants didn't have merit, the 
judge wouldn't have allowed it to go to the jury. 
Many of the Defendants and witnesses testified that people 
were laughing at Mr. Dansie as he was waving the pan. No one in 
this case won. "The jury called it a draw" (C.T.18), as stated 
by the Court. The Court counseled, "Hey, let's don't file motion 
against each. Let's don't stick each other with attorney's 
fees". This was the advise of the Court and yet 
Respondent/Appellant chose to ask for attorney's fees. 
If one side is awarded it's attorney's fees the other side 
should also have fees awarded under 78-27-56 U.C.A. 
The Court in this case went beyond the law in assessing 
attorney's fees to the Appellant and abused it's discussion in 
this case. There simply was not sufficient factual evidence for 
assessing attorneys fees to the Plaintiff/Appellant fees under 
U.C. annotated 78-27-56. 
22 
DATED thi s r> 3 
M-
day of , 1991, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that ten (10) copies of Appellant, 
J, Rodney Dansie's Brief were hand delivered and served on the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court this c J^ Q — day of\^^ApAx^M , 
1991 four (4) copies were hand delivered and served oxyLarry R. 
Keller, Attorney for Repondent/Defendant, at 257 Tower, Suite 
#340, 257 East 200 South - 10, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 this 
VJLY — day of <J>V^ULq , 1991. 
BRIEF/dansie.tif/adf 
23 
ADDENDUM A 
Utah Law Review 
Attorney's Fees in Bad Faith 
Meritis Actions p.593 — p.610 
1984 Utah Law Review 
Attorney's Fees in Bad Faith, Meritless Actions* 
In Cady v. Johnson,1 the Utah Supreme Court interpreted for 
the first time a new Utah statute that allows a court to award at-
torney's fees for civil actions brought without merit and not as-
serted in good faith.* In Cady, the supreme court set standards for 
lower courts to use in determining whether to award attorney's fees 
under the statute.* Although the opinion clearly states that a trial 
court must make three distinct findings in order to authorize an 
award of attorney's fees,4 the standards set by the supreme court 
are somewhat ambiguous. This comment will attempt to clarify the 
ambiguities of the court's opinion and make several suggestions for 
future application of the statute. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Utah courts have traditionally adhered to the American rule 
that attorney's fees cannot be awarded to a prevailing party in the 
absence of a specific statutory provision or an agreement between 
the parties.5 That rule is based on the assumption that imposing 
costs and expenses on the losing party will discourage citizens from 
asserting their legal rights.* 
The American rule contrasts sharply with the English practice 
of awarding costs, including solicitor's and counsel's fees, to the 
prevailing party in a lawsuit.7 Critics of the American rule have 
* The author is indebted to Lon Jenkins, a 1983 graduate of the University of Utah 
College of Law and former staff member of the UTAH LAW REVIEW. Much of the background 
information used in this comment was drawn from an unpublished article written by him. 
1. 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983). 
2. Act of Mar. 23,1981, ch. 13, § 1,1981 Utah Laws 24 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-27-56 (Supp. 1983)). 
3. 671 P.2d at 151. 
4. Id. 
5. See, e.g., Turtle Mgmt., Inc. v. Haggis Mgmt., Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 
1982); Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 66 (Utah 1981). 
6. In St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. Love, 57 Utah 450, 465, 195 P. 305, 311 (1921), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated its rationale for adhering to the American rule: "The courts 
of this state are always open to all for the redress of grievances and the protection of legal 
rights, and in our judgment they should refrain from allowing the imposition of costs and 
expenses upon the losing party except such as are provided for by statute . . . ." 
7. English courts have awarded counsel fees as a part of costs of litigation since the 
promulgation of the Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw., ch. 1 (1275). Fees were originally availa-
ble only to prevailing plaintiffs. A statute was passed in 1607, however, that permitted 
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advocated adoption of at least a modified English practice for two 
reasons: first, the American rule encourages intolerably congested 
courts;8 second, an injured party can never be made whole if he 
must pay his own attorney's fees.* 
Recognizing that the American rule had inherent problems, 
the federal judiciary created exceptions to the rule,10 including the 
federal bad faith exception.11 That exception authorizes a court to 
award attorney's fees against a party if the court determines that 
the party "acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppres-
sive reasons."12 Under that exception, bad faith may be found ei-
ther in actions that led to the lawsuit or in the conduct of the liti-
gation itself.18 
Similarly, a number of states have enacted statutes authoriz-
ing courts to award attorney's fees in civil actions where one party 
acts in bad faith or asserts a frivolous claim.14 Following that 
awards to prevailing defendants as well. 4 Jac, ch. 3 (1607). The current English practice 
essentially was established by the 1883 rewrite of the Rules of Court. Good hart, Costs, 38 
YALE L.J. 849, 851-72 (1929). That procedure requires a special taxing master, after the 
conclusion of a case, to determine the amount and appropriateness of costs to be awarded 
the prevailing party. For an extensive examination fo the English history of costs, see id. 
8. See Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IOWA L. 
REV. 75, 79-80 (1963). The American rule encourages parties with unfounded or feeble 
claims to bring suit in hope of recovering at least the nuisance value of the suit because such 
a party risks nothing but the coat of his own attorney's fees. See Ehrenzweig, Reimburse-
ment of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 792, 797 (1966). Parties 
faced with the possibility of being charged with double attorney's fees theoretically would be 
deterred from asserting unfounded claims or defenses. See Note, Attorney's Fees: Where 
Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1216, 1221 (1967) (quoting First Report 
of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts, 11 MASS. L.Q. 7, 63-64 (1925)). 
9. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 8, at 792; Note, supra note 8, at 1223. A party who 
pays substantial attorney's fees to defend himself against a frivolous suit, or one who must 
pay attorney's fees to recover an "airtight claim," has suffered real monetary damage. 
10. See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167 (1939) (attorney's fees may 
be awarded as costs in "exceptional cases and for dominating reasons of justice"). 
11. See F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex ret Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 
(1974). The other major exception is the "common fund exception," which permits a court 
to assess attorney's fees against a common fund that a successful litigant has procured for 
the benefit of a class of individuals. Id.\ see Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 
163-68 (1939). 
12. F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 
(1974) (footnote omitted). 
13. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980) (quoting Hall v. 
Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973)). 
14. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-341.01(0 (1982) (groundless and not in good 
faith); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West 1982) (frivolous and not in good faith, but "frivo-
lous" includes "not in good faith"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-17-101 (Supp. 1982) (frivolous); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.105 (West Supp. 1984) ("complete absence of a justiciable issue"); 
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 6F (Michie/Law Co-op Supp. 1983) (frivolous and not in good 
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trend, the Utah Legislature enacted section 78-27-561* in 1981, al-
lowing a court to "award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party if the court determines that the action or defense to the ac-
tion was without merit and not brought or asserted in good 
faith."" 
II. DECISION 
In Cady v. Johnson,17 the Utah Supreme Court considered 
Utah's bad faith attorney's fees statute for the first time. The 
plaintiffs18 in Cady had offered their home for sale under a listing 
agreement with Telford Realty Company. Rich Edwards, a sales-
man for All Seasons Realty, prepared a written offer of purchase 
that was signed by defendant Jared Johnson for his mother, defen-
dant Reta Johnson. Jared had no written power of attorney to sign 
the document for Reta.19 Jared also gave the salesman a $500 
check, drawn on his mother's bank account, as earnest money.10 
The plaintiffs subsequently vacated their home.11 On the closing 
date, the defendants did not appear, and later indicated that they 
did not desire to purchase the home.11 The plaintiffs refused to 
return the earnest money and instituted suit for additional dam-
ages, or in the alternative, for equitable relief for failure to perform 
the contract.18 
At trial, the plaintiffs' first cause of action was dismissed on 
their own motion,14 and their second cause of action was dismissed 
pursuant to the statute of frauds.15 The plaintiffs, therefore, were 
faith); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.21 (West Supp. 1984) (bad faith claim, frivolous claim, posi-
tion asserted solely to harass or delay, or fraud upon the court); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-26-01 
(Supp. 1983) (frivolous); Wis. STAT.'ANN. § 814.025 (West Supp. 1983-84) (frivolous, includ-
ing both bad faith and meritless claims). 
15. UTAH CODR ANN. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 1983). 
16. Id, The statute applies in all civil actions "where not otherwise provided by stat-
ute or agreement." Id. 
17. 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983). 
18. Plaintiffs in the case were Jon and Carolyn Cady (the vendors), Telford Realty 
and Rich Edwards, a salesman for All Seasons Realty. Defendants were Reta Johnson and 
her son, Jared Johnson. Id. at 150. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. Plaintiffs decided, on the strength of Andreasen v. Hansen, 8 Utah 2d 370, 
335 P.2d 404 (1959), that because they had retained the earnest money as liquidated dam-
ages, they were not entitled to additional damages. See Cady, 671 P.2d at 150. 
25. Cady, 671 P.2d at 150; see UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-1 (1976). The vendee's son 
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not entitled to damages or equitable relief for breach of contract.16 
In addition, the trial court granted the defendants' request for 
attorney's fees based on a finding that the plaintiffs had assured 
the judge that there would be valid issues for trial, even though 
they had no actionable claim.27 The judge concluded that if the 
plaintiffs had researched the law, they would have discovered that 
their claims were meritless and could have saved the court time by 
not pursuing the case.18 
The plaintiffs appealed both the summary dismissal of their 
second cause of action and the award of attorney's fees.29 The Utah 
Supreme Court held that the trial court was correct in dismissing 
the second cause of action,80 but vacated the award of attorney's 
fees because there was no proof that the suit was not brought in 
good faith.81 
In vacating the award of attorney's fees, the supreme court ad-
dressed the newly enacted section 78-27-56.82 It stated that for an 
award of attorney's fees to be made pursuant to the statute, the 
trial court must make three distinct findings. First, the party to 
whom the fees are to be awarded must prevail.88 Second, the court 
must find that the action or defense was "without merit."84 The 
supreme court stated that the term "without merit" was synony-
mous with "frivolous."85 The court then set out the dictionary defi-
nition of frivolous—"of little weight or importance having no basis 
in law or fact"86—and held that the trial court was correct to find 
that the plaintiffs' causes of action were "without merit."87 
Third, the trial court must find that an action or defense was 
not brought or asserted in good faith.88 The supreme court quoted 
Tacoma Ass'n of Credit Men u. Lester," which defined "good 
had no written power of attorney to act as her agent in signing the earnest money agree-
ment, so there was no valid contract. 
26. Cady, 671 P.2d at 151. 
27. Id. at 150. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 151. 
30. Id. 
31. Id at 152. 
32. Id. at 151-52 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 1983)). 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 151. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. 72 Wash. 2d 453, 433 P.2d 901 (1967), quoted in Cady, 671 P.2d at 151. 
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faith" as: 
(1) an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; 
(2) no intent to take unconscionable advantage of others; and 
(3) no intent to, or knowledge of the fact that the activities in 
question will hinder, delay, or defraud others.40 
To establish a lack of good faith under Tacoma, the trial court 
must find by "'sufficient evidence"41 that the party's conduct fails 
at least one of those three requirements.41 The court in Cady held 
that although better preparation might have disclosed to plaintiffs 
that their claims were meritless, failure to adequately research 
their case did not constitute bad faith.48 Further, there was no evi-
dence that plaintiffs did not hve an honest belief in their claim, 
that they intended to take unconscionable advantage of the defen-
dants, or that they intended to, or knew that their suit would, hin-
der, delay or defraud the defendants.44 Thus, because no evidence 
of bad faith existed, the supreme court overturned the award of 
attorney's fees.45 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Attorney's Fees Awards Under Section 78-27-56 
Under the supreme court's interpretation of section 78-27-56 
in Cady, three elements must be satisfied before a trial court may 
award attorney's fees. 
L Prevailing Party—First, an award of attorney's fees may 
be made only to a prevailing party.46 That element was not dis-
40. Tacoma, 72 Wash. 2d at 458, 433 P.2d at 904; see Cady, 671 P 2d at 151. 
41. Cady, 671 P.2d at 152. 
42. Id. at 151 (citing Sparkman & McLean Co. v. Derber, 4 Wash. App. 341, 481 P.2d 
585 (1971)). 
43. 671 P.2d at 152. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 1983)). In Utah, however, a party 
need not prevail on every issue to be considered a prevailing party. For example, in Check-
etta v. Collings, 78 Utah 93, 102, 1 P.2d 950, 953 (1931), the Utah Supreme Court held that 
a defendant who had lost on a counterclaim but not on the original claim was a prevailing 
party for purposes of cost assessment. Although the term "costs" usually does not include 
attorney's fees, "[wjhere attorney's fees are allowed to the successful party, they are in the 
nature of costs and are taxable and treated as such." 20 AM. JUR. 2D Costs § 72 (1965). 
Because of this close relationship between cost assessment and attorney's fees awards, the 
prevailing party rationale of Checketts should apply to the award of attorney's fees under 
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cussed in Cady because the defendants were clearly the prevailing 
party. 
2. Without Merit—Second, a court must determine that the 
action or defense was "without merit."47 The Cady opinion pro-
vides an easily understood and applied definition. A claim that is 
"without merit" is a "frivolous" claim.48 A frivolous claim is one 
with "no basis in law or fact."40 That standard basically makes the 
"without merit" determination a question of law;50 therefore, it 
should be fully reviewable by an appeals court.51 
Although the Cady court cited Can-Am Petroleum Co. v. 
Beck** for the proposition that "without merit" means "bordering 
on frivolity,"53 the court made it clear later in the opinion that a 
claim must be fully "frivolous" to be deemed "without merit."54 
The broader standard, "bordering on frivolity," would give a court 
greater leeway when determining whether a claim was "without 
merit." That broader definition would serve as a greater deterrent 
to groundless lawsuits and, in that sense, would better fulfill the 
legislature's intent.55 The word "bordering," however, adds greater 
subjectivity to the "without merit" determination. The "bordering 
on frivolity" standard is therefore more difficult to apply and to 
review. The "fully frivolous" standard is better adapted to the 
Cady court's objectives: "[I]t adequately serves the purpose of the 
section 78-27-56. 
47. Cady, 671 P.2d at 151 (citing UTAH CODB ANN. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 1983)). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. To use commonly understood legal concepts, a claim having "no basis in law" 
is one that would be properly subject to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 
FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6). Similarly, a claim having "no basis in fact" would be the proper 
subject of a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g.. FED. R. Crv. P. 56. 
50. See Sartor v. Arkansas Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 623 (1943) ("Judgment [under 
Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] is authorized only where 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . ."). 
51. See Automotive Mfr's Warehouse, Inc. v. Service Auto Parts, Inc., 596 P.2d 1033, 
1036 (Utah 1979). Although the decision whether to award attorney's fees under section 78-
27-56 is within the trial judge's discretion, the issue of whether the claim or defense was 
frivolous should be considered a separate question of law. Similarly, the issue of whether a 
party has acted in bad faith should be considered a separate question of fact. See infra 
notes 87-90 and accompanying text. 
52. 331 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1964). 
53. Cady, 671 P.2d at 151 (quoting Can-Am., 331 F.2d at 372) (emphasis added). 
54. Id. at 152. 
55. One of the purposes of the statute is to reduce congestion in the courts by en-
couraging settlement. Statement of Rep. Hillyard, Third Reading of H.B. 100, 44th Utah 
Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 5, 1981) (H.R. Recording Tape No. 6, side 1). 
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statute . . . and is clearly understood."6* Parties therefore should 
not be misled by the "bordering on frivolity" language in the Cady 
opinion; an action or defense must be fully "frivolous" to be held 
"without merit."" 
3. Bad Faith—Finally, the trial court must find that the los-
ing party's conduct lacked good faith before attorney's fees may be 
awarded.** Bad faith*9 conduct may occur during the following two 
time frames: The period leading up to a suit and during the suit.*0 
A finding of bad faith is based on the subjective intent of the 
party, and is usually determined from all of the facts and circum-
stances of the litigation, rather than from application of any strict 
legal test.*1 Thus, the bad faith determination is a question of fact 
and should be granted substantial deference on appeal.*1 
The Cady court provided guidelines for determining a party's 
good faith by setting out the definition of good faith used in Ta-
coma.** Good faith thus defined consists of these three factors: An 
honest belief in the claim; no intent to take unconscionable advan-
tage of the opposing party; and no intent to, or knowledge that the 
proceedings, will hinder, delay or defraud the other party.*4 The 
Cady court stated that to find bad faith, "sufficient evidence"** 
must "affirmatively establish"** that a party failed to satisfy at 
least one of those three tests.*7 Although the court's opinion pro-
vides those basic guidelines, more explanation is needed. 
First, the type of conduct being evaluated to determine bad 
faith is unclear from the opinion. Bad faith generally consists of a 
party's improper actions or motives that lead to a lawsuit, or im-
proper conduct during the litigation.** The Utah statute indicates 
66. Cady, 671 P.2d at 161. 
67. See supra notes 47-61 and accompanying text. 
58. Cady, 671 P.2d at 151. 
59. For purposes of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 1983), the court treats "lack 
of good faith" and "bad faith" as synonymous. Cady, 671 P.2d at 151-52. 
60. Cf. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973) ('"bad faith' may be found . . . in the 
actions which led to the lawsuit [and] in the conduct of the litigation"). 
61. Cf. Cady, 671 P.2d at 152 ("sufficient evidence" must "affirmatively establish" 
that a party has acted in bad faith). 
62. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text. 
63. Cady, 671 P.2d at 151 (quoting Tacoma, 72 Wash. 2d at 458, 433 P.2d at 904); see 
supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. 
64. See Cady, 671 P.2d at 151. 
65. Id. at 152. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973). 
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that for a trial court to award attorney's fees, it must determine 
that "an action or defense [was not] brought or asserted in good 
faith."89 That language can be interpreted in two different ways. 
The word "asserted" could be interpreted as relating only to the 
word "defense," and therefore, the party's bad faith must in some 
sense motivate the entire action or defense before attorney's fees 
may be assessed. That interpretation basically would make section 
78-27-56 a statute awarding attorney's fees for malicious prosecu-
tion.70 Although the Cady court stated that "the trial court must 
. o . find that plaintiffs conduct in bringing suit was lacking in 
good faith,"71 the intended reach of the statute seems broader. 
That interpretation therefore should be rejected. 
Alternatively, the word "asserted" could be interpreted as re-
ferring to the party's conduct during the litigation. Under that in-
terpretation, the question of good faith would be divorced from the 
"without merit" determination. The court first would determine 
whether the action or defense was "without merit" and then deter-
mine whether the party's conduct evidenced bad faith either in the 
actions or motives that led to the lawsuit,71 or in the conduct of the 
litigation.78 That interpretation should be correct because the third 
element of the Tacoma test, "no intent to . . . hinder [or] delay 
. . . others,"74 seems applicable to conduct during the litigation. 
Although the Utah statute is "narrowly drawn,"7* that construc-
tion is not unduly broad. The court must still find that an action 
or defense is "without merit" and that the litigant acted in "bad 
faith." 
Second, the factors used to determine when bad faith is pre-
sent are unclear from the Tacoma guidelines. The Cady court 
stated that the evidence must "affirmatively establish" a party's 
69. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 1983). 
70. Malicious prosecution is an action for the recovery of damages to person, prop-
erty or reputation that have proximately resulted from a previous civil or criminal proceed-
ing prosecuted unsuccessfully, without probable cause and with malice. 54 C.J.S. Malicious 
Prosecution § 1 (1948). Attorney's fees are normally an element of damages. Id. § 113. 
Under Utah law, malice can be inferred from filing a complaint without probable cause. See 
Potter v. Utah Driv-Ur-Self System, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 133, 135, 355 P.2d 714, 716 (1960). 
71. Cady, 671 P.2d at 151 (emphasis added). 
72. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 1983) ("action or defense . . . not 
brought . . . in good faith"). 
73. See id. ("action or defense . . . not. . . asserted in good faith"). This interpreta-
tion corresponds to the federal bad faith exception. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 
U.S. 752, 756 (1980) (quoting Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973)). 
74. Tacoma, 72 Wash. 2d at 458, 433 P.2d at 904. 
75. Cady, 671 P.2d at 151. 
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lack of good faith76 and held that mere failure to investigate the 
validity of the claim did not show bad faith under the Tacoma 
standard.77 Thus, the first clear test estblished by Cady is that 
negligent investigation of a claim does not, by itself, show bad 
faith.78 Because a party rarely will admit that its motives for litiga-
tion are improper,79 courts usually are required to consider sur-
rounding facts and circumstances to make subjective determina-
tions of bad faith.80 Several factors may provide guidance in those 
determinations. For example, courts have found bad faith where a 
party (1) has been defiant and uncooperative during litigatiorf,81 
(2) has been unresponsive to the demands of judicial process,82 (3) 
has made motions solely for the purpose of delay,88 (4) has at-
tempted to use judicial process for purposes other than obtaining 
the claimed relief,84 or (5) has been "stubbornly litigious."86 Each 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 152. 
78. See id. 
79. But see Ryan v. Hatfield, 578 F.2d 275t 277 (10th Cir. 1978) (plaintiff admitted 
before an investigating committee that suit was brought only to obtain defendant's testi-
mony for use in another pending suit); Scheriff v. Beck, 452 F. Supp. 1254, 1257 (D. Colo. 
1978) (defendant's evidence showed that plaintiff admitted his plan to harass defendant by 
instituting expensive litigation). 
80. See Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F.2d 473, 481 (4th Cir. 1951) ("in suit 
at equity where taxation of such costs is essential to doing of justice, [attorney's fees] may 
be allowed in special cases"); see also Gazan v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 6 F. Supp. 568, 568 
(E.D.N.Y. 1934) (special fact that plaintiff merely lent his name to suit, but was otherwise 
uninvolved with the litigation, warranted award under federal bad faith exception). 
81. Red School House, Inc. v. Office of Economic Opportunity, 386 F. Supp. 1177, 
1193 (D. Minn. 1974). 
82. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 755-56 (1980); United States v. 
Reserve Mining Co., 412 F. Supp. 705, 712-13 (D. Minn.), aff'd, 543 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 
1976). 
83. Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 605 F.2d 35, 40 & n.5 (2d 
Cir. 1978). 
84. Ryan v. Hatfield, 578 F.2d 275, 277 (10th Cir. 1978). 
85. The Utah Supreme Court awarded attorney's fees against a "stubbornly litigious" 
party who acted in bad faith in American States Ins. Co. v. Walker, 26 Utah 2d 161, 486 
P.2d 1042 (1971). The fee award in Walker resulted from application of UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78-33-10 (1977), which states: "In any proceeding under this chapter [concerning declara-
tory judgments] the court may make such award of costs as may seem equitable and just." 
In Walker, the court interpreted "costs" to include attorney's fees. There, the plaintiff-in-
surer refused to cover an insured's daughter who was involved in an automobile accident. 
The other party to the accident had a writ of garnishment issued to the insurer. Upon re-
ceipt of the garnishment, the insurer instituted a declaratory judgment action. At trial on 
the garnishment, the insurer was found liable to the insured's daughter. 486 P.2d at 1043. 
Additionally, the court awarded attorney's fees against the insurer on the declaratory judg-
ment action. The court reasoned that rather than instituting the declaratory judgment ac-
tion, the insurer simply could have answered the garnishment and raised its arguments in 
that case. The court concluded that the only purpose for. the hasty commencement of the 
602 UTAH LAW REVIEW [1984: 593 
of those factors could constitute bad faith under the Tacoma stan-
dard, but each provides a more concrete focus for use in making 
the bad faith determination.86 
J5. Standard of Review for a Bad Faith Finding 
A final question raised by the Cady opinion is the standard of 
review applied to the trial court's finding of bad faith. Although 
the Cady court set out the Tacoma standards as a guideline, the 
trial court's finding of bad faith necessarily will be based in part on 
a determination of the party's subjective intent. That finding is es-
sentially a finding of fact and is fundamentally different from a 
finding of frivolousness, which is based on objective legal stan-
dards. When the determination is essentially factual, the appellate 
court should not substitute its judgment for that of the trial 
court.*7 The trial court will be witness to the courtroom conduct of 
the party charged with bad faith. The appellate court will have 
only the record before it.88 Thus, if the trial judge is left with the 
conviction that a finding of bad faith is warranted, applying the 
Tacoma standards80 and the factors set out above,00 he should 
declaratory judgment action was to harass the plaintiff and force the plaintiff to expend 
money on counsel. Inferring that improper purpose, the court awarded counsel fees. Id. at 
1044. Walker suggests that instituting a second lawsuit, rather than pursuing the original 
lawsuit to its full conclusion, demonstrates bad faith. 
It is arguable that Walker applied a less restrictive bad faith standard than is permissi-
ble under section 78-27-56. While the court could infer the requisite improper motive, sec-
tion 78-27-56 also requires a determination that the action was without merit. There is no 
indication that the declaratory judgment action in Walker was unfounded; on the contrary, 
it clearly seemed to have merit. Therefore, under section 78-27-56, the Walker result may 
well have been different. 
86. The court presumably would hold that "self-induced myopia" concerning the 
merit of an asserted claim or defense would constitue bad faith. See Cady, 671 P.2d at 152 
(citing Catanzaro v. Masco Corp., 423 F. Supp. 415 (D. Del. 1976)). "Self-induced myopia," 
however, probably could be inferred only in the most egregious cases. "Self-induced myo-
pia" would seem to require a party to act with a "conscious purpose to avoid learning the 
truth." See United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 426 U.S. 951 
(1976). When a person commits a criminal act with such a purpose, coupled with a high 
probability of certain facts being true, he can be held to have acted "knowingly." Id. at 700, 
704. A finding that an attorney had asserted a claim or defense on behalf of his client with a 
conscious purpose to avoid learning whether the claim or defense had merit might justify 
not only an award of attorney's fees, but also a disciplinary action against the attorney. See 
infra text accompanying note 126. 
87. General Ins. Co. of America v. Lewis, 121 Utah 440, 441, 243 P.2d 433, 434 (1952). 
88. C/. McBride v. McBride, 581 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1978) (due deference should be 
given to findings of the trial judge who sees and hears the witnesses). 
89. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text 
90. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text 
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make a specific statement of his finding and reasons, cast in the 
terms of the Tacoma standard. Such a finding should be over-
turned on appeal only if the trial court abused its discretion.01 
IV. FUTURE ISSUES UNDER SECTION 78-27-56 
Several other questions not discussed in Cady are left open by 
the new Utah statute. 
A. Partial Attorney's Fees Awards 
The first issue is whether a court can award partial attorney's 
fees on a finding that one of several causes of action or defenses is 
without merit and not asserted in good faith. Section 78-27-56 pro-
vides that the court "may" award attorney's fees if the elements of 
the statute are satisfied.92 As a matter of statutory interpretation, 
use of the word "may" grants courts discretion in applying a provi-
sion,*8 suggesting that the court's range of options should be broad 
enough to allow a partial award of attorney's fees. If courts are 
willing to award partial attorney's fees, unfounded claims and de-
fenses may be removed from court. Because of the stringent re-
quirements that must be satisfied to justify an award under the 
statute, however, parties should not be deterred from pursuing le-
gitimate claims and defenses. 
Case law on that point is in conflict. One Colorado case that 
allowed an award of partial attorney's fees, Morton u. Allied Stores 
Corp.*4 was cited in Cady™ That case focused on the Colorado 
statutory counterpart to Utah's bad faith attorney's fees statute.96 
Under that statute, a court must award attorney's fees if the action 
is adjudged "frivolous."97 Courts, however, may use their discretion 
when determining the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded.98 
91. Cf. Williams v. Shearwood, No. 18512, Slip op. at 2 (Utah Aug. 15, 1984) (in di-
vorce proceedings, court stated that "(w)ith respect to the award of attorney fees . . . it is 
within the discretion of the trial court, on examination of the facte, to determine if the 
circumstances warrant an award of fees against one of the parties and in favor of the 
other. . . . We will not overturn the award, finding no abuse of discreation"). 
92. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (Supp, 1983). 
93. See AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 22 (1974). 
94. 90 F.R.D. 352 (D. Colo. 1981). 
95. Cady, 671 P.2d at 151. 
96. Morton, 90 F.R.D. at 358; see COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-17-101 to 406 (Supp. 1982). 
97. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-17-101(1),(3) (Supp: 1982); see Morton, 90 F.R.D. at 358. 
98. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-17-102(1) (Supp. 1982) ("The court may exercise its discre-
tion in determining whether attorney fees are to be awarded and as to the amount thereof 
so that manifest injustice may be avoided'') (emphasis added); see Morton, 90 F.R.D. at 
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In Morton, the Colorado Federal District Court determined that 
one of two claims asserted by the plaintiff was frivolous, and there-
fore ordered an award of approximately one-half of the attorney's 
fees incurred by the defendant in defense of the suit." 
Similarly, under the federal bad faith exception, attorney's 
fees for the entire litigation are awarded only if the action is 
brought in bad faith,100 or bad faith pervades the entire litiga-
tion.101 If the bad faith is found in conduct during the trial, courts 
have limited awards "to those expenses reasonably incurred to 
meet the other party's groundless bad faith procedural moves."102 
Thus, under the federal bad faith exception, partial awards actu-
ally may be the norm. 
Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton10* indicates the alterna-
tive point of view. In that case, an action brought under federal 
securities law, the district court stated that the plaintiff was not 
entitled to attorney's fees where it was not shown that the "total-
ity" of the defense bordered on frivolity or was made in bad 
faith.104 That holding can be distinguished. Under securities law, 
no finding of bad faith is required to allow an award of costs and 
attorney's fees to a prevailing party.108 A Utah court, however, 
must make a specific finding of bad faith before awarding fees 
under section 78-27-56.106 That distinction is critical. The Utah 
statute is punitive in nature,107 and it is reasonable to punish a 
litigant with a partial assessment of attorney's fees when part of an 
action is without merit and not pursued in good faith. 
The partial award would make the statute much more effec-
tive in saving court time. Parties would be encouraged to realisti-
cally evaluate the merit of each claim or defense they intend to 
368. 
99. Morton, 90 F.R.D. at 358. The court determined that manifest injustice would 
result if the court awarded the defendant all the attorney's fees incurred in defending the 
suit when only one of the plaintiff's claims was frivolous. Id. 
* 100. See Browning Debenture Holders Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078,1089 (2d 
Cir. 1977). 
101. See id. 
102. Id. 
103. 297 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 422 F.2d 1124 
(4th Cir. 1970) (court of appeals reversed district court's order of summary judgment of the 
case in chief). 
104. Id. at 1234. 
105. 15 U.S.C. | 77k(3) (1982). The suit or defense must have been "without merit." 
Id. 
106. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 1983). 
107. Cf. People v. Eatherton, 119 111. App. 3d 174, 456 N.E.2d 327, 330 (1983) (such 
statutes are intended to penalize parties who bring frivolous lawsuits). 
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argue before a court, and to assert only the valid claims or defenses 
available, rather than to use a shotgun approach. Thus, presenta-
tion of some cases would be streamlined. At the same time, be-
cause the finding of bad faith is required, parties would not be de-
terred from asserting valid claims. In the short run, determining 
whether each cause of action or defense is "without merit and not 
brought or asserted in good faith"IOi will prolong litigation. Over 
the long run, however, substantial time savings may be achieved as 
unfoundedxclaims are not pursued. Thus, the statute, case law, and 
public policy all indicate that partial awards should be allowed 
under the statute. 
B. Awards Assessed Against Attorneys 
Another issue raised by the Utah statute and not discussed in 
Cady is whether an award of attorney's fees under the statute may 
be assessed against the losing attorney rather than his client. Sec-
tion 78-27-56 allows a court to award attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party, but the statute does not specify against whom the award is 
to be assessed.109 In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper,110 the United 
States Supreme Court held that in limited circumstances courts 
could assess an award of attorney's fees against opposing counsel 
under the federal bad faith exception.111 
The lawyers in Roadway unreasonably extended the court pro-
ceedings.112 They consistently ignored court deadlines, refused to 
answer certain interrogatories, failed to appear for depositions, and 
failed to file briefs requested by the district court.118 The court dis-
missed their class action suit with prejudice114 and assessed attor-
ney's fees against the lawyers.1" Although the specific theory that 
the district court used to justify the fee assessment was overturned 
108. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-66 (Supp. 1983). 
109. Id. 
110. 447 U.S. 752 (1980). 
111. Id. at 764-67. Although Justices Stewart, Rehnquist and Stevens did not join in 
this portion of the opinion, id. at 764 n.ll, and Chief Justice Burger dissented, id. at 772, 
Justice Blackmun joined this portion of the Court's opinion in his concurrence, id. at 769, 
giving the Court a majority. Therefore, Part III of the opinion concerning a court's inherent 
power to assess fees against an opposing attorney under the federal bad faith exception 
constitutes a holding of the Court. 
112. See id. at 754-57. 
113. Id. at 755. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 756. 
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on appeal,116 the Supreme Court upheld the power of courts to as-
sess fees directly against counsel under the federal bad faith 
exception.117 
There are several reasons why an award against counsel is jus-
tified. First, "[t]he power of a court over members of its bar is at 
least as great as its authority over litigants."118 State courts also 
should have that power.119 Second, an attorney is in a better posi-
tion than his client to assess the merits of a legal claim because of 
his legal training.130 Further, the attorney is generally free to exer-
cise his discretion in the procedural conduct of a trial. Therefore, 
in circumstances such as those present in Roadway, it is more ap-
propriate to assess the award of attorney's fees against the losing 
party's counsel than against the losing party. The Utah statute is 
silent on that question, but the Roadway rationale seems to afford 
a sufficient basis for a judge to make such an award under the 
proper circumstances.121 
C. Section 78-27-56 and Attorney Disciplinary Action 
A third issue raised by the statute and not discussed in Cady 
is the relationship between section 78-27-56 and Disciplinary Rule 
7-102(A)(l) and (2) of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct 
of the Utah State Bar.1** Specifically, the question is whether an 
award of attorney's fees under section 78-27-56 should provide a 
basis for a disciplinary action under Utah's rules of professional 
conduct. 
First, Cady makes clear that negligent research of a case, by 
itself, will not support an award of fees under section 78-27-56.m 
116. Id. at 756-57, 767. 
117. Id. at 766-67. The case then was remanded to the district court to consider 
whether a finding of bad faith was warranted. Id. at 767-68. 
118. Id. at 766 (footnote omitted). 
119. See id. ("If a court may tax counsel fees against a party who has litigated in bad 
faith, it certainly may assess those expenses against counsel who willfully abuse judicial 
process"). 
120. See Comment, Awards of Attorneys' Fees Against Attorneys. Roadway Express, 
Inc. v. Piper, 60 B.U.L. REV. 950, 963-64 (1980). 
121. Under Rule VII(g) of the Rules of Discipline of the Utah State Bar, an attorney 
can be ordered to make restitution for damage caused by his unprofessional conduct. Attor-
ney's fees for bad faith litigation could be assessed against an attorney under that provision 
after a disciplinary proceeding. RULES OP DISCIPLINE OP THE UTAH STATE BAR Rule VII(g) 
(1979 & 1981). See infra notes 122-29 and accompanying text. 
122. REVISED RULES OP PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OP THE* UTAH STATE BAR DR 7-
102(A)(1) & (2) (1977). 
123. Cady, 671 P.2d at 152. 
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Under Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(2), an attorney is subject to dis-
cipline if he "[kjnowingly advance[s] a claim or defense that is un-
warranted under existing law, . . . [unless] it can be supported by 
good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law."124 Although not explicitly stated in the Cady opin-
ion, the conduct of an attorney who knowingly asserts an unwar-
ranted claim would fail both the Cady without merit test11* and 
the first element of the Tacoma test because the attorney does not 
have "[a]n honest belief in the propriety of the activities irj ques-
tion."126 Furthermore, if an attorney's conduct is the result of 
"self-induced myopia" concerning the merits of his client's claim, 
he could be held to have acted knowingly.127 In those situations, 
both an award of attorney's fees under section 78-27-56 and a dis-
ciplinary action under Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(2) are justified. 
Second, if bad faith conduct during the litigation gives rise to 
an award of attorney's fees under section 78-27-56, the attorney 
also may be subject to discipline under Disciplinary Rule 7-
102(A)(1).128 Under that provision, an attorney shall not "[f]ile a 
suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take 
other action on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is 
obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or mali-
ciously injure another."12* 
Two points should be made about that provision. First, not 
only is the attorney subject to discipline for knowingly violating 
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(l), but he also is liable for reckless fail-
ure to discover his client's improper purpose for bringing suit.130 
The statute uses an objective standard to determine whether an 
action is taken "merely to harass or injure," namely, whether its 
tendency to do so is obvious.181 Second, although the statute's 
scope seems narrow, because the action must be taken "merely" to 
harass or injure another, an award of fees under section 78-27-56 
will indicate that that standard has been satisfied in a broader 
124. REVISED RULES, OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE UTAH STATE BAR DR 7» 
102(A)(2) (1977). 
125. Cady, 671 P.2d at 151. 
126. Tacoma, 72 Wash. 2d at 458, 433 P.2d at 904; see Cady, 671 P.2d at 151-52. 
127. See supra note 86. 
128. REVISED RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE UTAH STATE BAR DR 7-
102(A)(1) (1977). 
129. Id. 
130. The attorney shall not "take . . . action . . . when it is obvious that such action 
would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another." Id. (emphasis added). 
131. Id. 
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range of circumstances. Because the standard of liability under 
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(l) is objective, it will be difficult for an 
attorney to answer in defense of his action that his subjective pur-
pose for pursuing a cause of action that has been held frivolous 
under section 78-27-56 was for a reason other than to "harass or 
maliciously injure" the other party. Thus, in many circumstances, 
an award of attorney's fees under section 78-27-56 for pursuit of a 
frivolous claim coupled with bad faith conduct during the litigation 
will provide a basis for a disciplinary proceeding under Discipli-
nary Rule 7-102(A)(l). 
D. Section 78-27-56 and the Erie Doctrine 
A final issue not addressed by the Cady court is whether the 
new Utah bad faith attorney's fees statute should apply in federal 
diversity cases under the Erie doctrine.132 If section 78-27-56 is in-
terpreted to be equivalent to the federal bad faith exception, that 
question may be purely academic.1" If the award of attorney's fees 
under a statute such as section 78-27-56 is a substantive right of 
damages, the state statute should be applied when a federal court 
sits in diversity.184 Otherwise, the federal court would be free to 
disregard the statute and follow federal practice. 
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,195 the 
United States Supreme Court indicated that state laws granting or 
denying the right to attorney's fees that reflect substantial state 
policies, and that do not run counter to federal statutes or rules of 
court, should be followed when a federal court sits in diversity.136 
Therefore, at first glance it would seem that a federal court would 
be bound to apply the Utah statute when it sits in diversity. The 
Utah State Legislature deliberately passed a statute that changed 
settled prior law,137 indicating that section 78-27-56 reflects a sub-
stantial policy of Utah and reflects legislative intent to grant a sub-
132. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
133. However, if the Utah statute is interpreted as requiring bad faith to have per-
vaded the entire litigation, and awards may not be based on bad faith conduct during the 
litigation, the Utah statute would be a narrower exception to the American rule than the 
federal bad faith exception. See supra notes 69-70, 100-102 and accompanying text. 
134. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 259 n.31 (1975) 
(suggesting that federal courts in diversity cases should follow state statutes allowing or 
denying awards of attorney's fees). 
135. 421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
136. Id. at 259 n.31. 
137. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. 
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stantive right. In Wetzel v. Goldsmith (In re Comstock),1** how-
ever, the federal bankruptcy court for the district of Idaho held 
that an Idaho statute similar to the Utah bad faith attorney's fees 
statute139 would not apply in a diversity case, despite the Supreme 
Court's statement in Alyeska.140 The court reasoned that the Idaho 
bad faith statute "does not grant a substantive right for additional 
relief in specific actions. It deals instead with the inherent right of 
courts to control, when circumstances demand, vexatious practices 
before them."141 The award of attorney's fees under section 78-27-
56, as indicated by use of the word "may," is discretionary with the 
court.142 It is difficult to argue that one has a substantive right to 
damages when the award of fees is discretionary. 
The distinction between substantive and procedural laws, 
however, "was never intended to serve as a talisman" for answering 
Erie questions.143 Rather, an Erie question must be answered by 
considering "the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of fo-
rum shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the 
laws."144 Both the federal judiciary and Utah courts may award at-
torney's fees for bad faith litigation. Application of the federal bad 
faith exception, therefore, will not encourage forum shopping. If 
the bad faith conduct occurs prior to the litigation, a court could 
award attorney's fees under either federal145 or Utah law.140 Fur-
ther, it is not likely that the choice to use a federal forum will be 
made based on a party's bad faith conduct during litigation be-
cause that conduct will not have been manifested until after the 
forum choice is made. Finally, neither the character nor result of 
the litigation will materially differ if the federal bad faith excep-
tion is used.147 Small variations in the situations in which attor-
ney's fees for bad faith litigation are awarded do not "raise the sort 
of equal protection problems which troubled the Court in Erie"149 
138. 16 Bankr. 206 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1981). 
139. See IDAHO CODE § 12-121 (1979), limited by IDAHO R. CIV. P. 54(e)(1). 
140. In re Comstock, 16 Bankr. at 209-10. 
141. Id. at 209. 
142. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
143. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (for purposes of the Erie 
doctrine, "[i]t is . . . immaterial whether statutes of limitations are characterized as sub-
stantive or procedural. . .") (quoted language is drawn from Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 
(1965)). 
144. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). 
145. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973). 
146. See Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). 
147. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 467. 
148. Id. at 468. 
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Thus, section 78-27-56 probably should not be applied in diversity 
cases, and federal courts should be free to use the federal bad faith 
exception instead. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Utah's bad faith attorney's fees statute is a narrow exception 
to the American rule. The court can award fees only to a prevailing 
party, and only after finding that the opposing party has both as-
serted a frivolous claim or defense and has acted in bad faith. Once 
those findings are made, however, the judge has substantial discre-
tion. He may make an award of partial attorney's fees. He also 
may assess the award against the opposing counsel rather than the 
opposing party. Courts should not hesitate to use their power 
under the statute once its elements are satisfied. Bad faith litiga-
tion is a burden on both courts and prevailing parties, and the leg-
islature has wisely sought to discourage such practices. 
R. GERARD LUTZ 
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JOHN C. THOMAS, JOE'TOTORICA, ] 
ELVIRA TOTORICA, KENNETH ] 
NORTON, WILLIAM TURNER, THOMAS ] 
B. SHIRLEY, ; 
Defendants. ] 
I VERIFIED 
I MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT | OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION | FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT 
• OR ORDER OR, IN THE | ALTERNATIVE, TO ALTER OR 
I AMEND THE JUDGMENT 
l Civil No. 880908191 
I Judge Leonard H. Russon 
Plaintiff, by and through his attorney, Dennis R. James of 
Morgan & Hansen, submits the following Memorandum in support of 
his Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order pursuant to Rule 
60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and in support of 
his Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment pursuant to Rule 59 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
FACTS 
This Court in its Judgment on Jury Verdict submitted by 
Attorney Larry R. Keller and purportedly signed by the Court on 
April 2 or April 3, 1990, ordered Plaintiff to pay attorney's 
fees to the Defendant William Turner in an amount in excess of 
$5,000. Plaintiff has brought a Motion pursuant to Rule 
60(b)(7) and Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requesting that the Court reconsider this order for fees. 
ARGUMENT 
Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
as follows: 
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court 
may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party . . . 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons: • . * (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." 
Plaintifffs request for this Court to reconsider its award 
of fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (bad faith action) is 
based upon the arguments as set forth below. For purposes of 
clarity and in order to present this Memorandum as a Verified 
Memorandum, it is set forth in first person format by Plaintifffs 
counsel, Dennis R. James. 
POINT 1 
The Order for Fees Is Contrary to the Court's 
Closing Pleci to the Parties 
to "Bury the Hatchet" and 
to Not Pursue Post-trial Motions 
The Court, at the close of trial and after dismissal of the 
jury, lectured to the parties to this litigation. The Court 
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counseled all parties that it was time to "bury the hatchet" and, 
although the Court acknowledged that it had earlier suggested 
that it would entertain motions for fees, the Court expressed a 
hope that such motions would not be brought. Subsequent to 
trial, I devoted a significant amount of time counseling with 
Plaintiff to follow the Court's admonition. 
I made an offer to Defendants1 counsel that I would not 
pursue motions for costs and fees if they did not. Defendants' 
counsel represented to me that if Plaintiff dropped his criminal 
action, it would go a long way in showing Plaintiff's good faith 
and would reduce the incentive of the insurance companies they 
represented to seek fees* 
I counseled Plaintiff to this effect and assumed this matter 
to be at an end* I was shocked to receive phone calls from Larry 
Keller - and George Naegle wherein they represented that Rod 
Dansie had been in contact with the County Attorney or his Deputy 
Attorneys and had insisted that they carry forward with the 
criminal action* They represented that Rod Dansie had told the 
County Attorneys that the reason he had been unsuccessful in the 
civil matter was because his attorney had not performed well 
enough against Mr. Keller. Mr. Keller and Mr. Naegle said that 
since it appeared Mr. Dansie wasn't going to quit, the insurance 
companies were insisting that they go forward with their motions 
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for fees. 
I called Mr. Dansie who denied the representations of Mr. 
Keller and Mr. Naegle I then contacted Richard S. Sheppard, 
Division Chief at the Salt Lake County Attorney fs Office to see 
if Rod Dansie had contacted him since the conclusion of the civil 
trial, or if Rod had contacted any of the Deputy County Attorneys 
under Mr. Sheppard who had any possible connection, past or 
present, with the Dansie criminal matter. After reviewing his 
phone log and after questioning his Deputy Attorneys, he reported 
back to me that Rod Dansie had not been in contact with anyone at 
the County Attorney's Office to the best of their records and 
recollection since the conclusion of the civil trial on February 
14, 1990. 
I contacted Rod Dansie about his intent to carry the 
criminal matter forward. He said he had none, but thought that 
he had no control over the County Attorney's Office once the 
Complaint had been filed. I arranged, with Rod's consent, a 
meeting with Dick Sheppard. Rod and I met with him on Friday, 
March 2,1990 and explained the situation and our concerns and 
desires, and he agreed to dismiss the criminal action. 
I called Mr. Naegle and Mr. Keller to report that the 
criminal action would be dismissed the following Monday. They 
had already commenced their motions for fees and in one of my 
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most disappointing experiences as an attorney in eleven years of 
practice, they insisted on carrying their motions forward. They 
represented that the insurance companies were insisting that they 
do so. I say disappointing because the decision to further "stir 
the water11 in this matter was, to some degree, based upon the 
outright lie that Rod Dansie had insisted on the criminal matter 
going forward and because bringing such motions was contrary to 
the spirit of conciliation and brought to naught all of my time 
and efforts in working with Rod on a new, less combative course 
of action in his life. 
If equities are a factor at all in the Court's 
determination, the good that can possibly come from Rod Dansie 
being made to pay, if it is even possible, $5,000 to William 
Turner's insurance company is grossly outweighed by the harm that 
will result. Not only will all of my efforts with Rod be undone, 
but I see terrible potential damage to a family. The Dansies 
were "beat up11 badly enough through this trial. Many lessons 
were indelibly imprinted on their minds. There were terrible 
financial costs in a home where they could not be afforded and 
even worse, there were severe emotional costs. 
As for legal grounds, the transcript of Rod Dansiefs 
testimony which has been ordered and which will supplement this 
Memorandum as soon as it is available, clearly reflects that his 
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action against William Turner was not brought in bad faith. 
Perhaps it was without merit, but it was not brought in bad 
faith. (See Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149.) 
The Defendants, contrary to the picture that was attempted 
to be painted, were not innocent victims of this litigation. 
This is equally true of William Turner, a man willing to rig his 
water line to bypass the meter because he felt Public Service 
Commission-approved rates were unconstitutional, a man willing to 
bring a counterclaim alleging that Rod Dansie regularly files 
lawsuits similar to this one, but who, in his deposition, was 
unable to give a single example of such actions (see pages 58 and 
59 of William Turner's deposition), a man willing to sign an 
affidavit under oath that he was placed in immediate apprehension 
of his personal safety by the waving of the pan, but who then 
gave opposite testimony in his deposition and at trial as he 
attempted to hold on to two conflicting positions, that he was 
never close enough to Rod to assault him but that he was close 
enough to Rod to be assaulted. An innocent victim is not someone 
who marches down the street with an angry mob and adds to the 
apprehension of the situation by making a threatening, inciting 
statement to the effect, "We've got you now, Rod." 
This is a plea to the Court to reconsider its award of 
attorney's fees in this matter. If the Court is not inclined to 
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eliminate them completely, then the plea is to reduce them 
significantly, especially in light of the fact that Larry 
Keller's bills accompanying his affidavit clearly include time 
devoted to his pursuit of a counterclaim which cannot be 
considered in an award of fees under U.C.A. § 78-27-56. His 
bills include, among other things, time devoted to preparation of 
the counterclaim, the entire trial time, and time devoted at the 
depositions of Defendants whose depositions I took for the 
purpose of seeking the dismissal of their counterclaims. He is 
asking for credit at $115 per hour which is far in excess of the 
standard rate for insurance defense work in the State of Utah. 
If the Court is insistent on holding to its decision to 
award fees against Mr. Dansie, I would request a reconsideration 
of the Court's decision with respect to awarding an equal amount 
of fees in favor of Mr. Dansie for having had to defend against 
Mr. Turner's counterclaim that was clearly without merit and 
brought in bad faith. (See my Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Request for Costs and Motion for Attorney's Fees and 
in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees.) 
DATED this 6 day of April, 1990. 
IS R. JAMES £/ 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Under oath, Dennis R. James states that he prepared the 
preceding Memorandum and that the factual allegations which he 
made therein are true and correct, to the best of his knowledge. 
/iL^^v./v S vL* 
IS R. JAMES// 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this (p day of April, 
1990. 
NC/CARY PUBLYC^ . ~ ^ 
Residing atz/kjuu? Utj*^ ^ 6 « o 
My Commission Expires: 
Jf/fo / *> 
11203M.PL 8 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I certify that on this day of April, 1990 a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing instrument was hand-delivered to 
the following named individuals: 
Larry R. Keller 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
George T. Naegle 
RICHARD, BRANDT, MILLER & 
NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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DENNIS R. JAMES, No. 1642 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
136 South Main Street 
Kearas Building, Eighth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-7888 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
J. RODNEY DANSIE, individually ] 
and as guardian ad litem for 
TIFFANY DANSIE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN C. THOMAS, JOE TOTORICA, j 
ELVIRA TOTORICA, KENNETH 
NORTON, WILLIAM TURNER, 
THOMAS B. SHIRLEY, 
Defendants.. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
I DENNIS R. JAMES 
i Civil No. 880908191 
I Judge Leonard H. Russon 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Dennis R. James, being first duly sworn, deposes and states 
as follows: 
1* That I never received and to this date have not 
received a copy of the proposed Judgment submitted by attorney 
Larry Keller in behalf of his clients, John C- Thomas,, Joe 
Totorica, Elvira Totarica, William Turner, and Thomas B. Shirley *, 
2. That I have questioned others in the law office of 
Morgan & Hansen, including Stephen G. Morgan, with respect to the 
receipt of a copy of said proposed Judgment, and no one is aware 
of ever receiving a copy of the proposed Judgment. 
3. My motivation in taking the depositions of all of the 
Defendants was to build a defense and hopefully obtain the 
dismissal of their counterclaims• 
DATED this T day of April, 1990. 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
^A. 
ENNTS R. JAMES^y7 
A t t o r n e y s f o r £ L a 4 n t i f f s 
<*V 
STATE OF UTAH 
7 SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE. ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
1990. 
*Q day of April, 
NOTARY PUBLI' 
s^iding at 
mr.Tr »
 A \~ 
^Jfw/nvl CdL 
My Commission Expires : : 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILINg 
I certify that on this 7 day of April, 1990 a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing instrument was mailed by first-
class mail, postage prepaid, to the following named individuals: 
Larry R. Keller 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
George T. Naegle 
RICHARD, BRANDT, MILLER &. NELSON 
Key Bank Tower Suite 700 
50 South Main 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
•£*&, 
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